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Abstract 
 
The Economic and Financial Adjustment Program Portugal signed with international 
organizations included several recommendations whose objective was to reduce healthcare 
expenditures. These recommendations aimed primarily at stimulating generic drugs 
consumption, thus reducing the public expenditure on healthcare (by reimbursement and 
reference pricing). In this study, first we test for the presence of structural breaks on 
relative prices; then, we use a time series approach to determine the exact month on which 
a structural break in generic drugs consumption occurred, using monthly data on generic 
drugs market shares and relative prices from January 2007 to December 2013. We identify 
one structural break on generic drugs consumption that coincides in time with 
administrative reductions on relative prices. This result highlights the importance of 
relative prices on the demand for generic drugs. 
JEL Codes: I18; K32; L16  
Keywords: Generic drugs consumption; Portugal; Policy Measurement; Structural Change 
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Resumo 
 
O Programa de Ajustamento Económico e Financeiro, que Portugal assinou com 
organizações internacionais, incluía diversas recomendações, cujo objetivo era reduzir os 
gastos nos cuidados de saúde. Estas recomendações visaram principalmente estimular 
consumo de medicamentos genéricos, reduzindo assim os gastos públicos em cuidados de 
saúde (por comparticipação e preço de referência). Neste estudo, primeiro testamos a 
presença de quebras estruturais de preços relativos; de seguida, usamos uma abordagem de 
séries de temporais para determinar o mês exato em que ocorreu uma quebra estrutural no 
consumo de medicamentos genéricos, usando dados mensais sobre as quotas de mercado de 
medicamentos genéricos e dos preços relativos entre Janeiro de 2007 e Dezembro de 2013. 
Identificamos uma quebra estrutural no consumo de medicamentos genéricos, que coincide 
no tempo com reduções administrativas dos preços relativos. Este resultado destaca a 
importância dos preços relativos da demanda por medicamentos genéricos. 
Códigos JEL: I18; K32; L16  
Palavras-Chave: Consumo de Genéricos; Portugal; Avaliação de Políticas; Quebra 
Estrutural 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction      
 
Health, according to the World Health Organization, is a “state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”, and is a 
fundamental right both on The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (on its article 25) 
and on Constitution of Portugal (on its article 64 of the first chapter). However, the 
preservation of such rights underlies the creation of Health Systems, which implies costs 
and relocation of resources to the health sector of such economy. In Portugal, the burden of 
public and private expenditure on Health corresponds, in 2010, to 10.2% of Portuguese 
GDP
1
, and had been rising since 2006. This subject deserves particular attention, since 
Portugal is, from 2011, under an external financial aid program. 
                                                     
1
 This data was collected from OECD ‘s website 
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Since Portugal signed with the Economic and Financial Adjustment Program, several 
recommendations were issued to the Portuguese Government in order to reduce the 
expenditures with health. These recommendations aim primarily on stimulating generic 
drugs consumption, thus reducing the public expenses on health (by reimbursement and 
reference pricing) and meeting the requirements established by that same document.  
The market share of generic medicines, according to Mendonca (2011), was 21.4% in 2011, 
and “(…) is consistently growing since 2000 (…)”. However, the main objective is to reach 
60% market share of generic medicines in 2014
2
.  
Several works study the impact of legislation on generic drugs consumption and the 
competition on drug markets, such as Aronsson et al. (2001), Dalen et al. (2006), among 
many others. There are also a few studies that study the impact of legislation and regulatory 
changes in Portugal, namely Barros and Nunes (2010), Barros and Nunes (2011) and 
Mendonca (2011). However, as far as we are aware, this study will be the first to study the 
impact of legislation imposed by the Economic and Financial Adjustment Program 
concerning a structural change in generic drugs consumption. 
All this considered, and given the importance of the subject, we intend to study how the 
consumption of generic medicines has changed (using generic drugs market shares as a 
proxy for generic consumption) after the introduction of such legislation. Our main goal is 
to answer these two questions: 
1. Were generic drugs consumption affected by legislation imposed by the 
MoU? 
2. What legal acts were capable of structurally change generic drugs 
consumption in Portugal? 
                                                     
2 
http://expresso.sapo.pt/governo-quer-que-farmacias-aumentem-venda-de-genericos=f831018 
(accessed in 11-01-2013.) 
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With these questions, we intend to find if the Portuguese drug market has structurally 
changed because of the legislation regarding generic drugs that came into effect after 2011 
and identify which legal documents were responsible for that structural change.  
The data we use for this study was collected in INFARMED’s website and contained 
monthly information regarding generic and brand-name drugs market shares, as well their 
monthly average price that we use to calculate the relative prices. The methodology used 
was a structural break analysis, in which we follow a two-sided approach: First, we test the 
presence of structural breaks in relative prices of drugs, since several legal documents deal 
with pricing policies. Then, we estimate the demand for generic drugs using a method that 
indicates us the date when the structural breaks occurred as well as the different coefficients 
for each partition on the sample.  
This study is organized as follows. After the introduction, presented in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 
presents the literature review where some key-concepts are defined and some theoretical 
framework of the research question mentioned above are presented. In Chapter 3, we 
present a review of the main legislation published after 2011 that concerns generic drugs.  
In Chapter 4 we present a methodological overview of this work and in Chapter 5 we 
present our main results and discuss those same results. Finally, in Chapter 6, we present 
the main conclusions to our study, its limitations and suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
2.1 Determinants of the demand for generic drugs 
 
The literature has identified several determinants of generic drugs market share, namely the 
price of generic medicines, the Reference Pricing System, Brand Loyalty, pharmacy level 
incentives to promote generic substitution, the role of trademarks and brands, among many 
others.  
2.1.1 Price 
After a pharmaceutical patent expires, competition in that market may take place when 
firms offering generic drugs, as a perfect substitution for the originating drug, enter the 
market, as stated by Dalen et al. (2006). The dynamics of the pharmaceutical market are 
well described by Manova et al. (2010), where they state that “Originating pharmaceutical 
companies seem to compete among themselves at a therapeutically level and with generics 
at a price level.”.  
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Several studies across the literature provide insights on the impact of price of brand-name 
drugs/generic drugs on its market share. Aronsson et al. (2001) studied how market shares 
for brand name drugs are affected by generic competition. They constructed a model where 
they estimate the relative change of market share for the original brand name drug as a 
linear function of the price of the original drug relative to the price of the generic drug. 
Using data from the Swedish Medical Product Agency, the authors have been provided 
with quarterly time-series data of prices and quantities for both original and generic drugs. 
The data refers to twelve different substances and its generic counterparts. Using a 
Cochrane-Orcutt technique to control serial correlation, they, ultimately, found that, on 
some substances, “(…) relative prices have a significant effect on the change of market 
share of the original product. The higher the price of the original product, relative to the 
average price of the generic substitute, the larger the decrease of the market share of the 
original product”.  
Dalen et al. (2006) studied the competition between generic drugs and original brand name 
drugs in the Norwegian market, specifically in what concerns the regulatory changes 
involving the yardstick-based price regulation. This regulation consisted on establishing a 
retail price cap or an “index price” on a drug, in order to trigger price competition. The 
authors used an empirical model with two steps: first, they estimated a demand model and, 
second, they derived a time-conditioned measure of market power for each product (Lerner 
Index), using the information on price elasticities acquired from step one. The results “(…) 
suggest that the index price [retail price cap] helped to increase the market shares of 
generic drugs and succeeded in reducing overall market power”.  
Manova et al. (2010) intended to study the impact of the entry of generic drugs in the 
pharmaceutical market, both on prices and market shares. They focused on the Bulgarian 
cardiovascular drug market between the years 2005-2007. The authors were trying to test 
two hypotheses: first, they tested the hypothesis whether the introduction of “new medicinal 
products (originators or generics) affect the sales and/or market share within the group”; 
and, second, they tested if “the introduction of new products (originators or generics) 
decreases the prices of the competitors within the group”. The data was collected from the 
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Bulgarian Ministry of Health and the methodology was, for the first hypothesis, the 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test and a z-test analysis to find statistically significant 
differences among the proportions sold during the years under analysis. For the second 
hypothesis they carried out a two-way ANOVA analysis and, if the result sample was 
ambiguous, a one-way ANOVA analysis. The results showed that generic competition 
changes the market in the observed country. 
Saha et al. (2006) developed a simultaneous equations estimation framework to perceive 
the interactions between generic drugs entry, market shares and prices. Using a panel data 
sample of 40 drugs that were exposed to competition over July 1992 to January 1998 
period, they found out that there are differences in the levels of generic entry in the market, 
depending on its market size, i.e., the blockbuster drugs attract more entrants than the small 
market sized drugs. They also found out that the average generic-to-brand name price ratio 
declines over time: by the end of the second year after the entrance, the average price of the 
40 drugs in the sample is only 41% of the brand name drug price; and, again, the price 
competition is much more intense on blockbuster drugs. Finally, their results suggest that 
“(…) generic market share influences and is influenced by generic prices, supporting the 
simultaneous equations estimation framework”.  
Frank and Salkever (1997) studied the price evolution in pharmaceutical market after the 
implementation of the Waxman-Hatch Act in 1984, in the United States of America. The 
authors collected a sample of 32 drugs that lost patents during that period and faced 
competition from generic drugs, and estimate models of price responses to that generic 
entry. Using a Two-Stage Least-Squares Fixed-Effects estimator and a Two-Step estimator 
on their models, they found that competition between generic drugs producers is related to 
price reductions for these drugs, besides price reductions on brand name drugs not being 
related to generic entry in that market. Finally, the authors found that “the substantial shift 
in market share from brand name drugs to generic producers (40%-50%) along with the 
significantly reduced price of generic substitutes (25%-30% lower) means that the average 
price of prescription for a compound subject to generic competition has fallen.”, meaning 
that the market share shift was triggered by price competition. 
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2.1.2 Reference Pricing System 
Pharmaceutical Reference Prices (RP) are, according to Dickson and Redwood (1998), 
“reimbursement ceilings set by payers in public and private sectors. Such payers will cover 
or reimburse the cost of listed drugs up to the reference price. Above that level, others 
(usually the patient or supplementary private insurers) have to pay the difference between 
the reference price and the actual price, or reimbursement of unlisted drugs may be 
refused”. The authors, in this paper, provided a clear definition of what RP are and how 
they are structured; an extended review on its status at the time; and the main RP models, 
namely the European Model, the Canadian Model and the US Model.  
 According to Galizzi et al. (2011), the introduction of RP is due to the effort to control 
health expenditures both on public and private sector. RP policy resides in clustering drugs 
with some sort of criteria, for example, bio-equivalence and therapeutic equivalence, and 
establishing a reference price to that cluster.  The authors aimed to comprehend the original 
scientific studies on the effects of the introduction of RP policies in OECD countries. The 
results showed that “Following the introduction of RP, generics market share significantly 
increased whenever the firms producing brand-name drugs did not adopt one of the 
following strategies: lowering prices to the RP value; launching new dosages and 
formulations; or marketing substitute drugs still under patent protection.”, meaning that 
Reference Price Systems (RPS) have an important effect on generic drugs market shares. 
Brekke et al. (2011) studied the impact on competition after the introduction of RPS on 
Norway in 2003. First, they built a theoretical differentiation model to analyse the impact 
of such regulation on prices and market shares of both brand name and generic drugs. After 
the model was defined, the authors postulated two hypotheses: the switch from the previous 
regulation (price cap regulation) to the RPS lead to reduction in brand name and generic 
drugs prices; and an increase in generic drugs market share. To test these two hypotheses, 
the authors used a database provided from Farmastat, a company owned by the Norwegian 
Association of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, which contained information about volume 
and value of each package sold in the Norwegian pharmaceutical market. Using a detailed 
panel data covering the 24 most selling drugs in the Norwegian market in 2001-2004 
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period, the authors showed that “(…) RP reduces brand-name and generic drug prices and 
increases generic market shares”, thus confirming the previous two hypotheses. 
The same type of study is followed by Podnar et al. (2007). The authors studied the impact 
of the introduction of RPS (in 2003) on generic and brand name drugs market share, in the 
Slovenian market. Their results showed that “(…) originator manufacturers tend to lose 
market share because of reference pricing.”. 
Simoens et al. (2005) studied the effects of the introduction of RPS in Belgium on generic 
drugs market share, between the years 1998-2003. The authors used data from IMS Health 
Belgium to trace general trends and data from Ifstat to analyze price evolutions of certain 
drugs. They found that “The market share held by generic drugs increased following 
implementation of the RP scheme”. They also found that “the low market share of generic 
drugs in Belgium principally drives from lack of incentives for physicians to prescribe 
generic drugs”. This last result is particularly important because there are some studies in 
the literature that consider physician/patient role on prescription and brand loyalty as a 
relevant determinant of brand name and generic drugs market share. 
2.1.3 Brand Loyalty, Physician/Patient/Pharmacy role on prescription 
Hurwitz and Caves (1988) studied how promotion, marketing and information can 
influence consumers on buying certain type of drugs (brand name versus generic drugs). 
After they provided a general description of the brand name and generic drug market 
worked, they analysed health professional’s decision-making process on drug prescription. 
They found that “The physician has no substantial economic incentive to choose the lower-
priced product, and doctors tend to be ignorant of specific drug prices. The brand name, 
simpler than the generic name, was learned when the drug was introduced and is easier to 
remember, and habit accordingly plays a strong role in the physician's prescription 
practice”. They also found that physicians have less faith in quality control on generic 
drugs manufacturers than of brand name drugs manufacturers. Using a sample consisting of 
150 drugs that were available as generics and had, at some point, a patent held by 
originating manufacturers, the authors construct a model to study the impact of sales-
9 
 
promotion on both generic and brand name drugs market shares. Their results showed that 
“the trademark holders' sales-promotion outlays do preserve their shares against incursion 
by generic entrants”, showing that trademarks have an important role on the evolution of 
generic drugs market share. 
Hellerstein (1998) studied the importance of physicians in the process of prescribing a 
brand name or a generic drug. The author argues that physicians, when playing as an agent 
for their patients, face some informational costs when prescribing medicines, such as 
collecting information on the availability and efficacy of generic drugs and price 
differentials between generic and brand name drugs, among others. It is costly, for the 
physician, to gather information about generic drugs, because its manufacturers do “(…) 
very little advertising, while information about new trade-name drugs is widely 
disseminated formally through advertising and the published results of drug efficacy 
studies. It may therefore be much more costly to a physician to learn about the introduction 
of new generic drugs”. Using a sample of 38.384 patient’s information, collected via a 
survey from 1.223 office-based physicians over the course of the year 1989 in USA, the 
author intended to establish a pattern in physicians’ drug prescription. Their results showed 
that “the central result is that the physician is an important agent in the prescription 
decision”. 
The same type of study is followed by Coscelli (2000). The author studied the contribution 
of physician and patient habits to persistence of market shares in prescription drugs market. 
Unlike Hellerstein (1998), the effects of both patient and physician, on prescribing 
behavior, can be isolated. This allows a better understanding of dynamics of prescription 
than aggregated data. Using a probit specification and a panel dataset provided by Italian 
National Health Institute, the author tested the null hypothesis of whether physicians and/or 
patients are indifferent between “different brands of the same molecule, as we would expect 
given their therapeutic equivalence [i.e. generic and brand name drugs]”. After rejecting 
this hypothesis, the author tried to isolate effects responsible for product differentiation. 
The results showed “significant evidence of doctor and patient `habit', which imply that in 
molecular sub markets in which brands are not allowed to compete on the basis of price, 
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habit persistence at the micro- level can translate into sticky and persistent market shares 
at the aggregate level”. She also found that “It is the state dependence at the micro level for 
the patients, and the habit persistence for the doctors, which lead to the persistence in 
market shares that we observe at the `macro' level”. 
Brekke et al. (2013) studied the pharmacies role in promoting generic substitution and thus 
stimulating competition between generic and brand name drugs. The authors first 
constructed a theoretical model where pharmacies can persuade patients with a prescription 
for a brand name drug to buy its generic counterpart. With this model, they showed that 
pharmacies incentives to substitution are determined by relative margins and relative co-
payments of drugs. This result meant that “a larger difference in margins between generics 
and brand name drugs increases the generics market share”, because it is more profitable 
(for the pharmacy) to promote the first. The authors also found that, through this model, the 
effect was stronger where drugs are subjected to reference pricing. To test the theoretical 
model, mentioned above, the authors collected data from two different databases (the 
Prescription and Wholesale database) of Norwegian Institute of Public Health. The 
prescription database contains information about prescription bound sales at pharmacy 
level from 2004 onwards, average prices and volumes per month over the 2004-2007 
period.  The Wholesale database contains information about producer prices “per product 
per wholesaler per month”. Using a fixed effect model regression and IV regression to 
control for endogenity issues, the authors found that “pharmacy margins on branded versus 
generic drugs have a strong association with generic market share”. However, the authors 
stressed that “that the empirical analysis has not established causality, and that [their] 
empirical findings can be interpreted as correlations only.”.  
Liu et al. (2009) studied the hypothesis of whether financial incentives had an important 
role on physicians prescription habits (between brand-name and generic drugs)  when they 
prescribe and dispense drugs. Using a data set containing detailed records of personal 
health care services “(…) including outpatient visits, hospital admissions, and prescription 
drugs” from 200.000 diabetes patients, the authors used a probit estimation to test the 
probability of a physician to prescribe a generic drug. Their results showed “(…) that the 
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profit margin between the reimbursement and the acquisition price has a significant effect 
on a physician’s prescription making decision”. 
Iizuka (2007) studied the physician-patient relation in drug prescription in Japan. Using 
panel-data from 40 hypertension medicines, such as physician’s mark-up, retail price, 
market share and product characteristics  (representing a data sample of 258 observations), 
the author found that “(…) physicians’ decisions are influenced by the markup they 
obtain.”, which “(…) suggests the existence of the agency problem in this market”. The 
author also found that physicians “(…) prefer to dispense drugs that cost less to the patient, 
ceteris paribus. Estimated parameter values indicate that physicians are willing to give up 
one dollar of their profit in order to reduce the copayment of non-elderly patients by 28 
cents. This implies that, although physicians do take advantage of markup, they care more 
about patient welfare than their own profits from markup.” 
Rischatsch et al. (2013) analyzed the role of physicians and patients financial incentives, 
when choosing between generic and brand name drugs, in Switzerland. Considering 
physicians as an imperfect agent for patients (since in some Swiss cantons, physicians “(…) 
are allowed to dispense drugs to their patients on their own account”) and using data 
provided by “(…) a major Swiss health insurer” representing 15% of Swiss population , the 
authors constructed a random-effects logit model where they tested some hypothesis, 
namely the likelihood of generic prescription compared to brand name drugs prescription 
due to higher income contribution; and generic drugs being more often prescribed to lower 
income individuals due to their marginal utility of income; amongst many others. Their 
results showed that “(…) financial incentives, agency towards the patient, and agency 
towards insurers are all found to markedly influence generic substitution” and “generics 
are prescribed more often to patients with high copayments or low incomes.”. 
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2.2 Studies on Portugal regarding generic drugs 
 
Mendonca (2011) reviewed the main policies intended to the generic drugs market in 
Portugal, since 2000. The author provides an overview of the key measures taken addressed 
to the generic drugs market since 2000 (such as the implementation of the RPS in 2002, 
price differentials between generic and brand drugs, among others) and provided, as well,  
an overview of new measures being prepared (at that time) to increase the prescription of 
generic drugs. The author argued that the measures taken in 2010 (changes in RPS) “(…) 
were important steps in order to create substantial financial incentives for patients to buy 
generics and also contributed heavily to reduce the expenditure of the NHS [National 
Health System] with ambulatory medicines.”. 
Barros and Nunes (2010) studied the impact of several policy measures on total 
pharmaceutical spending. The authors use data provided from public sources and checked 
with INFARMED between January 1998 and August 2008. The dataset contained 
information about payment made by NHS, information about total sales in value of 
pharmaceutical products and information about the number of boxes sold in the Portuguese 
market. Using a endogenous structural break approach, the authors found that “(…) a 
transitory slowdown in NHS pharmaceutical expenditure growth in the first half of 2003, 
coinciding with the start of the reference pricing system. However, this slowdown was 
relatively short lived. Before the end of the year, growth of pharmaceutical expenditure had 
returned to the historical path.” They also found that “Government determined price 
decreases have only a level effect. The underlying dynamics do not change.”,  
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Chapter 3 
 
Legislation review 
 
Governments and health authorities in particular, use legislation as their main instrument to 
implement policy and regulation to achieve the results proposed by themselves, or, in this 
case in particular, together with other authorities. Since those determinants of generic drugs 
consumption, discussed in the previous chapter, reveal what impacts the most on 
individuals and households process of choice, health authorities exploit those determinants 
as their object of legislation to achieve a better and faster impact on the drug market. As we 
will demonstrate next, by reviewing the main legal documents implemented by the 
Portuguese authorities, legislation and legislators use those determinants mentioned earlier 
as a mean to stimulate the generic drugs consumption and competition in the drug market, 
in Portugal. 
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Few studies present a review of legislation regarding medicines in Portugal. Mendonca 
(2011) and Barros and Nunes (2010), like we had seen in the last chapter, provided a good 
review on the results of the measures implemented by Portuguese legislators until 2010. A 
more detailed review on medicine policy was provided by Barros and Nunes (2011), in 
which the authors reviewed the previous ten years on medicine policy in Portugal, using 
different methodologies to determine the effects of all sorts of legislation created regarding 
medicines. Since there are several studies that review the legislation on medicines in 
Portugal until 2010, we will focus our legislation review on the main legislation 
implemented after 2010. We will review a few documents that came into effect in 2010 
only because we consider that documents are important to explain some legislation that 
were published subsequently. 
Law number 62/2011 from December 12 created a regime of disputes composition between 
generic and brand name drugs, when industrial and property rights are potentially being 
violated and altering reimbursement regime for drug prices. The main alterations to Law-
Decree number 176/2006 from August 30, regarding industrial and property rights, were 
that the request for market introduction of certain drugs could not be based on intellectual 
property rights and that the market introduction authorization could not be revoked or 
suspend on terms of intellectual property rights. However, if the originating drug owners 
dispute the market introduction of a generic drug on arbitral tribunal, the latter cannot carry 
on its commercial activity (generic drugs commerce) due to intellectual and industrial 
property rights of the originating firm. 
Inserted in set of measures, some of them imposed by the Memorandum of Understanding 
signed with International Monetary Fund and the European Central Bank, the Portuguese 
Government revised the drug policy with the Law-Decree number 112/2011 from 
November 29. This Law-Decree sets the maximum price for the first generic drug entering 
the market (a minimum 50% discount on the Stockist’s price and a minimum 25% for the 
retailer’s price, from the reference drug present in the market) and revised the reference 
15 
 
price system, altering the countries that serve as reference
3
. Regarding the revision of the 
reference price system, the countries that serve as comparison are Spain, Italy and Slovenia. 
This Law-Decree was, however, changed many times along the years. The first time was by 
Law-Decree number 152/2012 from July 12. This document changed/revised some articles 
of the previous Law-Decree. The most relevant changes were: as assigning the regulatory 
powers regarding price revision exclusively to the Government member assigned with the 
Health affairs; changing the public entity responsible for the price authorization 
(INFARMED); and setting the originating drug’s price as the average of the last two 
previous years. 
The second change was made by Law-Decree number 34/2013 from February 27. This 
document intended to revise some articles in order reduce the burden on health expenses 
through National Health System (NHS). To do so, the Portuguese Government determined 
that the three countries used as comparison for price setting are determined annually 
4
, and 
the retail price for parallel imported drugs, to be introduced in the Portuguese drug market, 
should be 5% lower than the retail price for the same medicine and its equivalents. 
Complementary to Law number 112/2011 are Portaria number 3/2012 and Portaria number 
4/2012, both from January 2. Portaria number 3/2012 defines the criteria, deadlines and 
proceedings for exceptional price revision, predicted on Law number 112/2011. Portaria 
number 4/2012 set the rules and deadlines for price formation and revision. 
Portaria number 4/2012, however, was altered two times since it came to effect. The first 
was by Portaria 335-A/2013 from November 15, altering the deadlines for price transition 
after the date the new price is approved.  The second time that Portaria number 4/2012 was 
altered was by Portaria number 367/2013. This document suspended the application of the 
article that obliges for annual price revision, since the generic drugs average prices are 
lower than the maximum prices would be set after such price revision. Therefore, the 
                                                     
3
  According to this Law-Decree, the retailer’s price is composed by the stockist’s price plus the wholesaler’s 
margin, the retailer’s margin and taxes. These margins are regulated by the Portuguese Government, as we 
can see in Section IV of this document. 
4
  The criteria used were GDP per capita similar to Portuguese’s GDP per capita (comparable by purchase 
power parity) or a lower price for each drug in particular. 
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legislator considered that “(…) there is no justification at present to proceed with its 
review in 2014, if the same average level do not suffer significant changes.”. 
The Law number 11/2012 from March 8 sets new rules on drug prescription and dispense. 
This document revises the rules on drug prescription, namely obligating physicians to 
declare the INN, among many other things, of the drug that they are prescribing; the receipt 
for such prescription must be filled electronically
5
. On the other hand, this document also 
regulates the pharmacy’s way to proceed. Pharmacies must inform patients, in the act of 
dispense of drugs, of the existence of generic drugs (if they exist), and the patient has the 
right to choose between a generic or a brand-name drug, even if the drug prescribed was, in 
fact, a brand-name drug. 
Complementary to the previous document, comes Portaria number 137-A/2012. This 
document establishes the legal regime to which the rules of prescription and dispense of 
medicines obey, created by the Law number 11/2012, and define new rules about to 
information provision to patients. These new rules obligate pharmacies to inform which are 
the cheapest drugs available, for that specific prescription and leave the patients the right to 
choose between the drugs available.  
Related to the Law number 11/2012 and Portaria number 137-A/2012 is the Portaria 
number 340/2012 from October 25. This document creates Pharmaceutical and Therapeutic 
Comissions to evaluate and control the pattern of drug prescription and dispense. It also 
regulates the mechanisms of such evaluation in order to Health authorities have some 
degree of evidence about the effectiveness of prior legislation. 
The Law-Decree number 48-A/2010 from May 13 showed the intents for a comprehensive 
review of the reimbursement system for medicines, with special focus on some regimes, in 
order to gain equity. The main objectives of this document is to improve access to 
medicines, to make the reimbursement system more efficient and sustainable and, finally, 
to promote the generic medicines substitution. To achieve those objectives, this Law-
                                                     
5
  Due to Information Technologies (IT), the physicians have information regarding cheapest drugs  (brand-
name or generic) available on the market, which are set by the Government member responsible for the 
Health affairs.  
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Decree sets some measures, namely: 100% reimbursement rate, for the cheapest five 
medicines for each homogeneous group, to patients who are in the special regime; 
shortening the deadline for a decision on reimbursement in the price of a generic drug; new 
rules on generic drugs pricing, for each homogeneous group, when they have, at least 5% 
market share on generic drugs market. It also contains other amendments, “(…) in 
particular fixing marketing margins to existing levels in 2005, without this entailing any 
modifications to approved retail prices or impact on costs for the National System of 
Health.”.  
The previous document has been altered many times during the years. The Law-Decree 
number 106-A/2010 made the first alteration. This document’s objective was to promote 
fairer rules to medicines access and to combat fraud and abuse on reimbursement from 
NHS. To achieve those goals, the legislator reviewed, among other things, the rules for 
reimbursement approval.  
The second alteration came by Law number 62/2011, which had already been covered. The 
third amendment was by Law-Decree number 103/2013 from July 26. This document 
reviews the process reference prices approval for each medicine’s homogeneous group and 
reviews the mechanisms of homogeneous group’s formation, in order to promote savings 
from substitution to generic drugs. 
As we can see by this chapter, all the documents directly intervened in the drug market 
through different determinants of generic drugs consumption suggested by the literature, 
such as price, Reference Pricing Schemes and Brand Loyalty and the Physicians and 
Pharmacies role on drug prescription, to ultimately promote generic substitution, whether 
by imposing to mention in the prescription that a generic drug is available for that particular 
originating drug or just by administratively reducing prices of drugs. 
One final remark to this chapter is that it makes clear the bond between literature and 
Government regulation and policy, since the information and knowledge created by the 
scientific community is useful to Government authorities, and ultimately ends to being 
useful to patients too.  
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Chapter 4 
 
Methodological Overview 
 
 
4.1 Data 
This study uses data from INFARMED- National Authority of Medicines and Health 
Products, IP 
6
 - that publishes reports, on a monthly basis, regarding the evolution of 
average prices and market shares (both on volume and value) of generic and non-generic 
drugs, in Portugal. This data was collected at INFARMED’s website, specifically from the 
“Market Monitorization” section. This INFARMED’s section follows the evolution of the 
                                                     
6
 
http://www.infarmed.pt/portal/page/portal/INFARMED/MONITORIZACAO_DO_MERCADO/OBSERVAT
ORIO/ANALISE_MENSAL_MERCADO  
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drug market accessibility and puts together the determinants of such evolution in order to 
provide support on political decision-making. 
The reports contained in this section gather information related to generic and non generic 
drugs market shares, average prices and, in some years, the National Health Service’s 
(NHS) expenses on drugs. These reports are published on a monthly basis and covered the 
period between January 2006 and January 2014, in Portugal. The months of both 2006 and 
2014 years were not included in the sample since they were not included on the information 
provided by INFARMED about prices of both generic and non-generic drugs that we 
requested by e-mail. 
The main indicators used in this study are Generic Drugs Market Share on Volume in 
Ambulatory and Relative Prices between generic and non-generic drugs (generic drug 
prices divided by non-generic drug prices). The information about these variables was all 
collected within the information provided by those reports. Additionally, I contacted 
INFARMED to provide information about non-generic drugs average prices (monthly 
discriminated), in order to accurately set the relative prices for each month of the analyzed 
period. 
According to INFARMED, generic drugs market share in ambulatory is defined as the 
percentage of generic drugs on the total amount of drugs sold during the analyzed period. 
To set the relative prices, I divided the generic drugs average price to non-generic drug 
average price, for each month, using the information contained in those reports and the 
information supplied by INFARMED via e-mail. We choose this approach to better study 
the effects of price and price competition on generic drugs market share. 
 
4.2 Methodology 
We analyze the impact of the legislation regarding generic drugs in Portugal, introduced 
after 2010. The main objective of this study is to find out if there was a change in generic 
drugs consumption triggered by such legislation, in Portugal, in that period. Therefore, we 
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address this issue with a structural break perspective, i.e., we test if there was a structural 
break in the generic drug market share series, as a proxy for the generic drugs consumption 
pattern, after the introduction of the legislation. Hence, we follow an endogenous approach, 
as we use various methods and let the series itself determine the structural breaks and 
determine what legal acts were responsible for such break. 
As it was said before, we use the relative prices, instead of the actual prices of generic 
drugs, to better capture the effects of competition based on price between generic and non-
generic drugs. 
The model we use to determine the impact of relative prices on generic drugs market share 
is: mrkt_share_volt=β1+β2*relative_pricest +β4*T+εt , where mrkt_share_volt stands for 
generic drugs market share over the period t, relative_pricest stands for the relative price 
between generic and non-generic drugs over the period t and, finally T stands for the trend 
of the model. The growth trend in the mrkt_share_vol series can be seen clearly along the 
entire sample, as Figure 1 shows above, and, for that particular reason, we decided to 
include the trend in our model. 
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Figure 1- Generic Drugs Market Shares Evolution  
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However, this model is only valid if the relative prices are an exogenous variable, which is 
not clear. For that particular reason, we must analyze the presence of structural breaks in 
the relative prices series. 
To test the presence of structural breaks in relative_pricest, we estimated it as 
relative_pricest = β1 + relative_pricest-1 +εt, as relative_pricest-1 stands for a one-period 
lagged variable of relative_pricest 
7
.  
The method used, for both full model and relative prices analysis, was a built-in method in 
Eviews 8 named “Least squares with Breaks” (BreakLS), which follows an Ordinaray Least 
Squares (OLS) estimation with a similar approach of the Multiple Breakpoint Test, as 
described by Bai and Perron (1998).  
The results of these estimations are presented in the next chapter, as well their main 
conclusions and implications. 
  
                                                     
7
  The presence of relative_pricest-1 on this regression controls and removes the presence of serial 
correlation and, thus, validates its results 
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Chapter 5 
Results and Discussions 
 
5.1 Relative prices  
 
In this section, we present the main results of our estimations. Table 1 shows the 
summarized results of the estimation using the BreakLS method, regarding the presence of 
structural breaks in relative prices. The number of observations included in the sample was 
83, which is the total number of months between February 2007 and December 2013, 
which was due to adjustments. Please note that the model used for this particular estimation 
was relative_pricest = β1 + relative_pricest-1 +εt, , and that the lagged variable  was included 
due to the inertia of relative prices. Additionally, the inclusion of this lagged variable 
helped to prevent serial correlation in the estimation
8
. An extended output of this estimation 
is presented in Appendix A. 
                                                     
8
 To test the presence of serial correlation, we used the Breusch-Godfrey Serial LM test. The results 
can be seen in Appendix B 
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Method BreakLS 
Specifications 
HAC standard errors & covariance (Quadratic-
Spectral kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth); 
Allow heterogeneous error distributions across 
breaks 
Break Dates 2008M10; 2010M06; 2012M04 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
R
2
 
0,9945 
 
 
Variable Coefficient P-value 
Partition  
1(number of 
observations: 
20) 
C 0,5281 0,0425 
Lag_Relative_prices 0,6653 0,0001 
Partition 
2(number of 
observations: 
20) 
C 0,8146 0 
Lag_Relative_prices 0,2835 0 
Partition 
3(number of 
observations: 
22) 
C 0,0351 0,2535 
Lag_Relative_prices 0,9372 0 
Partition 
4(number of 
observations: 
21) 
C 0,4325 0 
Lag_Relative_prices 0,255 0,0667 
 
Table 1 – Summarized results of the presence of structural breaks in relative prices, using the BreakLS 
method 
 
As shown by Table 1, the BreakLS method revealed that there are three structural breaks in 
the series. These breaks occurred in October 2008, June 2010 and April 2012. To a more 
clear perception on the evolution of the relative prices and their structural breaks, please see 
Figure 2, showed below. 
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Figure 2- Graphical representation of structural breaks on relative prices  
 
These results can be consequence of legislation published by the time the structural break 
occurred. The structural break in October 2008 can be consequence of the implementation 
of Portaria number 1016-A/2008 of September 8, which came into effect on October of the 
same year. This legal document reduced the maximum retail selling prices for generic drugs 
by 30%, for generics with retail prices above 5€.  
The structural break in June 2010 can be the outcome of the implementation of two legal 
documents, namely Law-Decree number 48-A/2010 of May 13 (but the date it came into 
effect was in June 1
st
) and Portaria number 312-A/2010 of June 11 (but the date It came 
into effect was July 1
st
). The Law-Decree number 48-A/2010 reviews some regimes on 
reference pricing and reimbursement rates for generic medicines; and Portaria number312-
A/2010 sets new rules on drug pricing, its annual review and its alteration. Additionally, 
this document set new rules on retail pricing for the new generic drugs to be subject to 
reimbursements.  
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The impact of these two documents cannot be identified separately, because they coincide 
in time. Although the last legal document has entered into effect after the month identified 
structural breaks, its effects may have been triggered in June, once it laid down the rules to 
be applied in the following month. The individual effect of these documents cannot be 
tested separately to know which of them has the dominant effect, because their effects 
coincide in time. So, we only can identify their aggregate impact, which lead to a structural 
break in June 2010. 
Finally, the structural break in April 2012 can be consequence of two documents, namely 
Law number 11/2012, which dates March 2012 and Portaria number 137-A/2012, which 
dates in May 2012, and sets the legal regime described by the previous document. These 
two documents intended to encourage the use of generic drugs in Portugal, in detriment of 
brand-name drugs, by requiring the prescription of drugs by International Non-Proprietary 
Name (INN). The ultimate goal is improve the efficiency of National Health System, since 
legislators state that generic drugs “(…) may play a pivotal role in promoting rationality 
and sustainability of the National Health Service (NHS), as well as generating significant 
savings for citizens.”.  
Despite these two documents did not regulate prices of neither generic nor brand-name 
drugs, it is clear that they lead to a structural break in relative prices of drugs, hence 
producing an indirect effect on relative prices. This result can be explained with the fact 
that these two documents may have led to price competition between generic and brand-
name drugs on the drug market, thus leading to a structural break.  
However, these two documents have not been published or came into effect in April 2012. 
One reason to that is that retailers may have anticipated the publication of Portaria number 
137-A/2012 after Law number 11/2012 (published in March), and may have triggered an 
increase in generic drugs prices, by generic drugs manufacturers, in April (one month 
before the legal regime for the latter document was created) of the same year, which led to 
an increase of relative prices. Please note that this increase can be seen in Figure 2, when 
analyzing the relative prices during 2013. 
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5.2 Generic drugs market Shares  
In this section, we studied the impact of relative prices on the demand of generic medicines. 
Table 2 shows the summarized results of the estimation using the BreakLS method.  
 
Method BreakLS 
Specifications 
HAC standard errors & covariance 
(Quadratic-Spectral kernel, Newey-
West fixed bandwidth); Allow 
heterogeneous error distributions 
across breaks 
Break Date 2008M11 
Prob(F-statistic) 0 
R
2
 
0,9802 
 
 
Variable Coefficient 
P-
value 
Before 
Breakpoint 
(number of 
observations: 
22) 
C 0,3346 0,0104 
Relative_prices -0,1314 0,0775 
Trend -0,0001 0,8794 
After 
Breakpoint 
(number of 
observations: 
62) 
C 0,1238 0 
Relative_prices -0,0267 0,0198 
Trend 0,0021 0 
 
Table 2 – Summarized output of the estimation of the demand of generic drugs, using Least Squares with Breaks 
method 
The number of observations included in the sample was 84, which is the total number of 
months between January 2007 and December 2013, and shows that the relative prices are 
responsible for explaining 98.02% of the variation of the generic drugs market shares. It 
should be noted that the variable relative_prices is statistically significant only after the 
identified break, since its p-value<0.05.  
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However, this model has some specifications for a more accurate estimation of the 
breakpoint dates, using a “sequential test in all subsets” method 9 and to prevent for serial 
correlation, namely the HAC (Newey-West) coefficient covariance matrix, as described by 
Newey and West (1986) and often used to correct the effects of correlation,  and allowing 
errors distributions to differ across breaks. These specifications can be seen in the top part 
of the output presented in Table 2. 
This method provided us a quicker and more efficient estimation of the dates where the 
structural break occurred, since it automatically conducted a Multiple Breakpoint Test 
described on Bai and Perron (1998), which presents a sequential application of breakpoint 
tests. A detailed description of how this test works is provided by  Eviews 8 User’s Guide 
(2013)
10
. Additionally, and since the object of this study is to test for a structural break, the 
output present the different coefficients for each partition of the sample on the date the 
break occurred, thus allowing us to interpret the different impacts of relative prices on the 
demand for generic drugs for each partition of the series. 
On Appendix C is represented an extended visualization of the BreakLS estimation output 
and on Appendix D is presented an extended breakpoint specification analysis provided by 
Eviews at regarding this specific estimation and containing information about the test 
conducted to determine the breakpoint dates. Additionally, in Figure 3 is presented a 
graphical representation of this estimation. 
Regarding the sign of the coefficients of relative prices, determined by the estimation 
present in Table 2, it is possible to verify that in all partitions of the sample, both are 
negative. Please note that the coefficient of the Trend is positive in the second partition.T 
his result shows not only that the impact of relative prices on the demand for generic drugs 
has changed after the structural break, but also that an increase in relative prices leads to a 
decrease on the demand for generic drugs in Portugal, as expected.  
                                                     
9
 This method uses a Bai test of breaks in all recursively determined partitions. 
10
 Eviews user’s guide is provided by EViews after the installation of the software. 
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Figure 3 - Consumption of generic drugs, using the BreakLS method 
 
The next step is to test the presence of autocorrelation in the model and thus validating the 
method used in this study. The presence of autocorrelation invalidates all of the statistical 
hypothesis tests done under the OLS method. Using the built-in test in EViews 8, we 
conduct a Breusch-Godfrey Serial correlation LM test, to test the presence of 
autocorrelation, as described in Godfrey (1978) and Breusch (1978) and the summary 
results are showed on Table 3. 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test: 
F-statistic 2.180.572     Prob. F(2,74) 0.1200 
Obs*R-
squared 
4.558.622 
    Prob. Chi-
Square(2) 
0.1024 
 
Table 3 – Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test summary results 
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As Table 3 shows, there is no evidence of the presence of autocorrelation, since the 
Prob.Chi-Square is 0.1024, which leads us to not reject the null hypothesis of no serial 
correlation, thus validating the all statistical hypothesis of this estimation. An extended 
output, containing more information regarding this test can be found on Appendix E.  
The estimation presented in Table 2 showed that there was only one structural break in the 
series, namely in November 2008. 
The structural break that occurred in November 2008 can be consequence of the legislation 
pack composed by Law-Decree number 184/2008 and by Portaria number 1016-A/2008 
both published in September of that same year. These two legal documents complement 
each other, since the first established that generic drugs prices can be subject to exceptional 
revision at any point in time and that revision must be published by Portaria, and the second 
legal documents sets the first generic drugs price revision authorized by the previous 
document. Please note that Portaria number 1016-A/2008 imposed reductions of 30% on 
generic drugs prices above 5€.  
However, the reasons why the structural break occurred in different months may be due to 
the possibility of postponing the consumption of medicines, by the patients, thus leading to 
a structural change in the demand of generic drugs. 
Just like a previous structural break identified on our relative prices analysis, the individual 
effect of these documents cannot be tested separately to know which of them has the 
dominant effect, because their effects coincide in time. So, we only can identify their 
aggregate impact, which leads to a structural break in November 2008.  
Our results are consistent  with the results of Aronsson et al. (2001), since relative prices 
have a significant impact on generic drugs market shares and, therefore, in the market 
shares of the brand name drugs, since the increase in relative prices resulted in the decrease 
in generic drugs market share, in all partitions. Additionally, our results are also consistent 
with the results found by Dalen et al. (2006), since that the introduction of a retail price cap 
in drugs prices helped to increase the generic drugs market shares. 
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In sum, these results present an interesting insight on the impact of legislation and its 
dynamics. First, on our relative prices analysis, we found that three structural breaks 
occurred during the entire period covered. The first two were motivated by legislation that 
regulates prices directly, thus reducing the relative prices. The last structural break was 
unexpected since it was a result of a legal document that targeted the demand for generic 
drugs and did not intend to regulate prices. Additionally, following the conclusions of 
Hellerstein (1998), the April 2012 structural break result reinforce the importance of 
physicians and pharmacies on the process of prescribing and dispense of medicines, since it 
is clear that the new rules on such matters led to a structural break after their 
implementation.  
Finally, our main model studies the relationship between generic drugs market shares and 
relative prices in our generic drugs market share approach. Our results showed only one 
structural break and that structural break was motivated by a legal pack intend to reduce 
generic drugs prices. This structural break highlights the importance of relative prices on 
the demand for generic drugs. However, this model was not able to indicate any legal 
document, intended to stimulate directly the demand for generic drugs, capable to create a 
structural break in the consumption of generics. Despite this, it does not mean that this 
legislation has not produced effects the demand for generic drugs, since it may have 
contributed to the growth trend of generic drugs market shares during the entire period 
covered. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Conclusion 
 
This study was set out to stress the effectiveness of the legislation regarding generic 
medicines substitution, imposed the Economic and Financial Adjustment Program Portugal 
signed with international organizations. More precisely, our main objective was to 
determine which legal documents were more effective on creating a structural break in 
generic drugs consumption in Portugal.  
The results in our relative prices structural break approach indicate three structural breaks 
on relative prices: in November 2008, in June 2010 and in April 2012. The breaks coincide 
in time with legislation regarding price reductions and new rules on prescription and 
dispense of medicines, by physicians and pharmacies, respectively. It was expected, since 
most part of the legislation published concerns relative prices, that there were structural 
breaks motivated by legislation concerning reductions in relative prices. However, the 
result in the April 2012 structural break, were unexpected, since it dealt with prescription 
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and dispense rules, thus not concerning relative prices directly. It seems that these two legal 
documents triggered a raise in generic drugs price (that ultimately resulted in relative prices 
increases), by generic drugs manufacturers.  
Finally, our approach on generic drugs consumption showed that the structural break in 
generic drugs consumption occurred in November 2008 and coincides in time with a legal 
package that intended to reduce generic drugs prices. However, this model was not able to 
indicate any legislation intended to stimulate directly the demand for generic drugs capable 
to create a structural break in the consumption of generics. Despite this, it does not mean 
that this legislation has not produced effects the demand for generic drugs, since it may 
have contributed to the growth trend of generic drugs market shares during the entire period 
covered. 
This result allows us to see that the legislation pack intended to stimulate the consumption 
of generic drugs, imposed by the Economic and Financial Adjustment Program, was not 
successful and Portuguese authorities lack policy tools to stimulate generic consumption.  
On the other hand, the positive evolution of the generic drugs market shares has been 
important to competition on drug market, since it can drive prices down from both generic 
and brand-name drugs, lightening the household’s expenses on medicines.  
This study focused on aggregated data published on a monthly basis by INFARMED in its 
website. Taking that into consideration, future research may go through the same kind of 
study we conducted, but on a micro-level, selecting the most and/or least sold generic and 
its brand-name counterpart drugs, and see if that same legislation triggered some structural 
change in their consumption. Another subject that could be analyzed in further research is 
to study the impact on the top most imported drugs after the implementation of Law-Decree 
number 182/2009, and subsequent revisions, to see if there was an increase of importation 
of such drugs and its impact on prices and market shares. Finally, this study can also be 
replicated, for further research, but this time analyzing the hospital drug market.   
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This study has offered some insights on the effectiveness of legislation regarding generic 
drugs consumption, and was conducted using data provided by INFARMED. So, has a 
direct result of this methodology, it has encountered some limitations, namely the lack of 
variables .It is so because some data were not available in the entire period covered, namely 
the Public expenses on the National Health System (data only available since January 2012 
onwards), average reimbursement rates (only available for the years 2010 and 2011) and 
the number of generic drugs available in the market (data only available for the years 2010, 
2011 and 2012). It would be interesting to study the impact of these variables on the 
generic drugs market shares and, therefore, on generic drugs consumption. Although the 
relative prices can explain almost perfectly the variations of generic drugs market shares, 
we believe that adding more variables such average reference price and reimbursement 
rates and physicians prescription patterns, just as Coscelli (2000), can help to provide more 
insights on physicians and pharmacies role on the demand of generic drugs, in Portugal. 
Another issue that we faced was that the data of some variables mentioned was not 
available for the entire period covered, then, it could not be included in the model and we 
could not stress out the impact that those variable may have on generic drugs consumption. 
In the face of such limitations, we presented a study that sought to analyze the impact of 
various types of legislation and found that prices are the only responsible for creating the 
structural breaks in generic drugs consumption in Portugal. This result enforces the idea, 
identified by Mendonca (2011), that generic drugs prices have important implications on 
generic substitution policy not only from potential savings of households and the 
Portuguese Government, but also on Health authorities on changing public perception on 
generic drugs. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A – Extended output for the estimation of relative prices using 
the BreakLS method 
 
Dependent Variable: RELATIVE_PRICES  
Method: Least Squares with Breaks  
Sample (adjusted): 2007M02 2013M12  
Included observations: 83 after adjustments  
Break type: Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined partitions 
Break selection: Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5, Sig. level 0.05 
Breaks: 2008M10, 2010M06, 2012M04  
Allow heterogeneous error distributions across breaks 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     2007M02 - 2008M09  --  20 obs 
     
     C 0.528146 0.255960 2.063397 0.0425 
LAG_REL_PRICES 0.665328 0.159487 4.171687 0.0001 
     
     2008M10 - 2010M05  --  20 obs 
     
     C 0.814696 0.063952 12.73920 0.0000 
LAG_REL_PRICES 0.283587 0.054654 5.188715 0.0000 
     
     2010M06 - 2012M03  --  22 obs 
     
     C 0.035177 0.030568 1.150761 0.2535 
LAG_REL_PRICES 0.937298 0.034645 27.05419 0.0000 
     
     2012M04 - 2013M12  --  21 obs 
     
     C 0.432507 0.080403 5.379226 0.0000 
LAG_REL_PRICES 0.255070 0.137099 1.860476 0.0667 
     
     R-squared 0.994525    Mean dependent var 1.033735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994014    S.D. dependent var 0.382548 
S.E. of regression 0.029597    Akaike info criterion -4.110850 
Sum squared resid 0.065700    Schwarz criterion -3.877708 
Log likelihood 178.6003    Hannan-Quinn criter. -4.017187 
F-statistic 1946.258    Durbin-Watson stat 2.241787 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix B- Results of the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test 
in the relative prices estimation 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 1.178808    Prob. F(2,73) 0.3134 
Obs*R-squared 2.596712    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2730 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 2007M02 2013M12   
Included observations: 83   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     @BEFORE("2008M10") -0.201230 0.208522 -0.965027 0.3377 
@BEFORE("2008M10")*LAG_REL_PRICE
S 0.125479 0.129996 0.965252 0.3376 
@DURING("2008M10 2010M05") -0.013489 0.085913 -0.157003 0.8757 
@DURING("2008M10 
2010M05")*LAG_REL_PRICES 0.011779 0.073454 0.160352 0.8730 
@DURING("2010M06 2012M03") -0.004141 0.042899 -0.096535 0.9234 
@DURING("2010M06 
2012M03")*LAG_REL_PRICES 0.004419 0.048614 0.090897 0.9278 
@AFTER("2012M04") -0.059712 0.134431 -0.444182 0.6582 
@AFTER("2012M04")*LAG_REL_PRICES 0.101398 0.229118 0.442559 0.6594 
RESID(-1) -0.237025 0.154405 -1.535081 0.1291 
RESID(-2) -0.071924 0.129704 -0.554526 0.5809 
     
     R-squared 0.031286    Mean dependent var -6.15E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.088145    S.D. dependent var 0.028306 
S.E. of regression 0.029527    Akaike info criterion -4.094442 
Sum squared resid 0.063644    Schwarz criterion -3.803016 
Log likelihood 179.9194    Hannan-Quinn criter. -3.977364 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.014354    
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Appendix C – Extended output for the BreakLS estimation of the demand 
for generic drugs, using HAC estimators to correct serial correlation 
 
Dependent Variable: MRKT_SHARE_VOL  
Method: Least Squares with Breaks  
Sample: 2007M01 2013M12   
Included observations: 84   
Break type: Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined 
partitions 
Break selection: Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5, Sig. level 0.05 
Breaks: 2008M11   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Quadratic-Spectral kernel, 
Newey-West fixed bandwidth) 
Allow heterogeneous error distributions across breaks 
     
     
Variable 
Coefficie
nt Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     2007M01 - 2008M10  --  22 obs 
     
     C 0.334698 0.127438 2.626359 0.0104 
Relative_prices -0.131496 0.073513 -1.788734 0.0775 
@TREND -0.000178 0.001169 -0.152268 0.8794 
     
     2008M11 - 2013M12  --  62 obs 
     
     C 0.123816 0.017617 7.028057 0.0000 
Relative_prices -0.026767 0.011252 -2.378976 0.0198 
@TREND 0.002175 0.000163 13.33926 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.980218    Mean dependent var 0.191498 
Adjusted R-squared 0.978950    S.D. dependent var 0.056811 
S.E. of regression 0.008243    Akaike info criterion -6.690258 
Sum squared resid 0.005299    Schwarz criterion -6.516628 
Log likelihood 286.9908    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.620460 
F-statistic 772.9949    Durbin-Watson stat 1.970378 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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Appendix D – Description of the breakpoint specification used in the 
BreakLS estimation  
 
Breakpoint Specification  
Description of the breakpoint specification used in estimation 
    
    Summary 
    
    Estimated number of breaks: 1  
Method: Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined 
        partitions  
Maximum number of breaks: 5  
Breaks: 2008M11   
    
        
Current breakpoint calculations:  
    
Multiple breakpoint tests  
Bai tests of breaks in all recursively determined partitions 
Date: 08/28/14   Time: 02:28  
Sample: 2007M01 2013M12  
Included observations: 84  
Breakpoint variables: C RELATIVE_PRICES @TREND 
Break test options: Trimming 0.15, Max. breaks 5, Sig. level 0.05 
Test statistics employ HAC covariances (Quadratic-Spectral 
        kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth) 
Allow heterogeneous error distributions across breaks 
    
    Sequential F-statistic determined breaks:  1 
    
       Scaled 
Break Test   Break F-statistic F-statistic 
    
    0 vs. 1 * 2008M11 19.53062 58.59187 
1 vs. 2 --- --- --- 
1 vs. 2 2006M12 4.578280 13.73484 
    
    * Significant at the 0.05 level, Bai-Perron (Econometric Journal, 
        2003) critical value 13.98. 
    
Break dates:   
 Sequential Repartition  
1 2008M11 2008M11  
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Appendix E – Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test extended 
output results for the BreakLS estimation of the demand for generic 
drugs 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
     
     F-statistic 2.180572    Prob. F(2,76) 0.1200 
Obs*R-squared 4.558622    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.1024 
     
          
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 2007M01 2013M12   
Included observations: 84   
Presample missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     @BEFORE("2008M11") -0.017025 0.052440 -0.324665 0.7463 
@BEFORE("2008M11")*RELATIVE_PRIC
ES 0.009714 0.030532 0.318154 0.7512 
@BEFORE("2008M11")*@TREND 0.000175 0.000466 0.375679 0.7082 
@AFTER("2008M11") -0.006172 0.022144 -0.278706 0.7812 
@AFTER("2008M11")*RELATIVE_PRICE
S 0.003686 0.014490 0.254359 0.7999 
@AFTER("2008M11")*@TREND 5.73E-05 0.000192 0.298462 0.7662 
RESID(-1) -0.001941 0.116092 -0.016717 0.9867 
RESID(-2) -0.242819 0.116280 -2.088232 0.0401 
     
     R-squared 0.054269    Mean dependent var -2.09E-18 
Adjusted R-squared -0.032837    S.D. dependent var 0.007990 
S.E. of regression 0.008121    Akaike info criterion -6.698436 
Sum squared resid 0.005012    Schwarz criterion -6.466930 
Log likelihood 289.3343    Hannan-Quinn criter. -6.605372 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.991777    
     
     
 
 
 
 
